Environment Essay: The evolution of the linkage between the environment and human rights

Environment Essay: The evolution of the linkage between the environment and human rights The United Nations (UN) Conference on the Human Environment, held in Stockholm in 1972, declared that: mans environment, the natural and the man-made, are essential to his well-being and to the enjoyment of basic human rightseven the right to life itself. Today, the relationship between the environment and human rights has long been recognised and has evolved in many ways. This essay will attempt to analyse the connection between the environment and human rights. Because of limitations on length, it will broadly place human rights within the framework of a holistic view of development (i.e., one that lends importance to more that simply economic development). It will also discuss their relationship within the discourse of Sustainable Development, a principal concept linking the environment and human rights. The UN Conference on the Human Environment was held at a time when development discourse was dominated by theories of dependency, world systems, and modes of production. The Stockholm conference importantly acknowledged that environmental issues are best handled with the participation of all concerned citizens, and in that capacity established not just the importance of sustaining the environment because it provides for life and basic human rights, but also the importance of sustaining basic human rights in an attempt to defend the environment. Though the need to protect the environment had long been recognised, this conference paved the way for the environment and development to be discussed as a single issue something that did not occur until the Brundtland Report in 1987. The Brundtland Report launched the term Sustainable Development (SD), or development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their needs (WCED, 1987: 43). Although it is often regarded as a dangerously slippery concept (The Economist, 2002) the common characteristic of most definitions of the term is the emphasis on equity both across and within generations. Barrow (1995: 17) identifies ten themes that characterise conventional SD: maintenance of ecological integrity; integration of environmental care and development; adoption of an international stance; satisfaction of basic human needs for all; stress for normative planning; stress on application of science to development problems; acceptance of some economic growth; attaching a proper value to the natural and cultural environment; the adoption of a long-term view of development; and, again a call for inter- as well as intra- generational equality SD has introduced and affirmed many new concepts into the development arena including, but not limited to, a rights-based approach to development and the importance of the environment. The environment played a central role in the Brundtland Report, and it was subsequently attacked for being eco-centric. The Brundtland Report was followed up by the UN Conference on Environment and Development, held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. Though the Rio conference set in motion a trend towards human (rather than environmental) rights, it still held the environment in the limelight. Moreover, rights to information, participation and remedies in respect to environmental conditions formed the focus of the Rio declaration (Shelton, 2002: 2), thus accentuating the importance of human rights in environmental protection. Since Rio, concern for the environment has (rightly) continued to grow. However, the tendency toward concern for human rather than environmental rights within the sustainable agenda (i.e., a growing concern for the intra- (as opposed to inter-) generational equality) has continued as it is acknowledge that we cannot ignore the deprived today in trying to prevent deprivation in the future (Anand and Sen, 2000: 2030). Many of the alternate definitions of SD have tried, with varying degrees, of success, to resolve the seemingly contradictory notion inherent to SD development frequently involved capitalist or industrial development, and thus the reference to sustainability is certainly then undermined by the paradox of what this type of development means for the environment (Redclift, 1987). Conventional wisdom holds that Southern nations are too preoccupied with economic survival to worry about environmental quality (Dunlap: 1994: 115), something that was, to some extent, reflected in the Rio conference. Governments of developing countries wanted to discuss the idea of development, and the governments of richer countries that of sustainability (to the neglect of development) (Dunlap: 1994: 115). Though economic development need not be unequivocally associated with environmental degradation it must also be recognised that nations (or perhaps more importantly, people within nations) will rightly put more focus on sustaining peoples well-being than the environments. In short, though some government policies in the developing world may be viewed as inconclusive because they fall short of protecting natural resources, such seemingly irrational policies may reflect economic necessity in countries that have little choice but to perpetuate practices that contribute to environme ntal degradation in the absence of alternate sources of income (Bryant and Bailey, 1997: 59). This view of environmental protection versus human rights was pertinent at the UN World Summit on Sustainable Development (or Rio + 10), held in Johannesburg in 1992. In the run-up to the summit African leaders made it clear that they expected to talk about jobs, not birds (The Economist, 2002b). The Economist stated that without concrete or pragmatic action to fight poverty, fine words on greenery, global warming or fish stocks will come to naught (The Economist, 2002b). In other words, sustaining deprivation cannot be our goal (Anand and Sen, 2000: 2030), and whilst surely the conditions for most of the worlds poor can be sustained, the issue is that they should not be (Marcuse, 1998: 106). SD is often received with hostility in LDCs where it is seen as an attempt to challenge the developing worlds elemental right to develop: after all, grinding poverty, it turns out, is pretty sustainable (The Economist, 2002b). The achievement of environmental protection and respect for human rights can only be reached if we do not succumb to the notion that they are mutually exclusive. Human life, and human rights, cannot exist without a relatively healthy environment, and the environment cannot be protected without the acceptance and protection of basic human rights. Though aspects of each may at times need to be sacrificed for progress in the other, it remains vital to navigate the obstacles and move towards a sustainable world. Bibliography Anand, S. and Sen, A. (2000) Human Development and Economic Sustainability, World Development, 28 (12), 2029-2049.Barrow, C. J. (1995) Sustainable Development: Concept, Value and Practice, Third World Planning Review, 17(4), 369-386.Bryant, R. L. and Bailey, S. (1997) Third World Political Ecology, London: Routledge.Dunlap, R. (1994) International Attitudes Towards Environment and Development, in Helge Ole Bergensen and Georg Parmann (eds.), Green Globe Yearbook of International Co-operation on Environment and Development, Oxford: Oxford University Press), 115-126.Marcuse, P. (1998) Sustainability is not enough, Environment and Urbanization, 10(2), 103-111.Redclift, M. (1987) Sustainability: life chances and livelihood, London: Routledge.Shelton, D. (2002) Human Rights and Environment Issues in Multilateral Treaties Adopted between 1991 and 2001, background paper for the Joint UNEP-OHCHR Expert Seminar on Human Rights and the Environment, Geneva, 14-16 January 2002.The E conomist (2002) The Johannesburg Summit: Sustaining the poors development, 29 August 2002.The Economist (2002b) Africa expects to talk about jobs, not birds, 22 August 2002.WCED (1987) Our Common Future, The Brundtland Report, Oxford: Oxford University Press. State Of Nature: Hobbes And Locke State Of Nature: Hobbes And Locke Thomas Hobbes and John Locke applied fundamentally similar methodologies and presuppositions to create justifications for statehood; both have a belief in a universal natural law made known to man through the exercise of reason, which leads to political theories that define the rise of states. From beginning to end, Hobbes and Locke struggle to answer the essential question: Can sovereignty be divided? Though the two authors answer this question by going through the same processes, they begin with distinct notions of the state of nature, thereby reaching divergent conclusions: two nuanced versions of the social contract. For Hobbes, sovereignty is absolutist and governance can only succeed if power is concentrated in a monarch. On the other hand, Locke envisions a radically different structure for government, with a strict division between legislative and executive forces. At a glance, it is difficult to determine which author better answers the question of sovereignty, but by compar ing the warrants beneath their claims, one comes to discover that Locke is correct. Indeed, sovereignty must be divided. To start, one must analyze the model of undivided sovereignty. Hobbess argument for the state is that at some point, constituents of society made a contract amongst themselves to surrender most of their natural right up to a single man, the monarch, establishing a sovereign power in their newly formed commonwealth (Hobbes 110). By permutation, children must obey the sovereign because they are subject to their parents by the natural law, meaning subjection to the sovereign power passes on from one generation to the next (Hobbes 127-35). What constitutes a commonwealth is a group of individuals and their progeny, who are all subject to the sovereign power. This, however, begs the question of exactly what constitutes the sovereign power, since natural right can be forfeited in both different ways and in varying degrees. Hobbes provides two answers to this question, the latter directly expanding upon the former. The first is that Hobbes defines, albeit vaguely, that sovereignty is an entity bearing the person (Hobbes 105-110) of those subject thereto. Second, he argues in a more concrete manner, that sovereignty is the extensive set of powers to make laws, reward and punish subjects arbitrarily, choose counselors and ministers, establish and enforce class distinctions, judge controversies, wage war and make peace, and so on (Hobbes 113-15). Hobbes claims that by giving up their person to the sovereign, subjects forfeit the right to make moral judgments because every act of the sovereign is ostensibly performed by the subjects. The monarch becomes the sole, absolute judge of whatsoever he shall think necessary to be done, both beforehandà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã‚ ¦and, when peace and security are lost, for the recovery of the same and what opinions and doctrines are averse, and what conducing, to peace (Hobbes 113 ). In other words, citizens may never criticize the sovereign, since subjects surrender their very ability to judge whether the sovereign power is acting towards the goals for which they established it. This is a major contradiction in Hobbess theory, for it seems strange and inconsistent that men of the commonwealth are wise enough to establish a state for mutual benefit (Hobbes 106), but straightaway upon entering the social contract, lose the ability to accurately judge whether their condition is good or bad. Although there is such a clear inconsistency within the contract, Hobbes has a two-pronged defense ready. The first is in Chapter XVIII, where he asserts that once covenanted, men cannot lawfully make a new covenant amongst themselves to be obedient to any other, in any thing whatsoever, without permission from the sovereign (Hobbes 110-1). With the way that a Hobbesian social contract works, this claim makes perfect sense; if a covenant is formed by submitting ones person to the sovereign, men cannot form a new covenant independent of the sovereign because they have already given their single person-hood up. Following the person argument, Hobbes introduces the idea that à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã‚ ¦because the right of bearing the person of them all is given to him they make sovereign by covenant only of one to anotherà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã‚ ¦ (Hobbes 111). The philosophers second defense then, is the fact that the sovereign is not party to the actual contract, which means that the monarch can never breach it, no matter the consequences. For Hobbes, the contract is the permanent transfer of person from a group of people to an external man, not a retractable agreement among a group of people to obey one of their party. The agreement, strangely, is only amongst the governed their agreement is to all equally forfeit their person and aligns with Hobbess notion that there must be an external, superior enforcer to contracts. Yet, it is unclear why social contracts should be irrevocable: in Hobbess own account of contracts (Hobbes 79-88), a contract is always renounceable if the parties involved agree so, meaning there should be nothing stopping subjects from uniformly nullifying the contract. Hobbes would respond that social contracts are unique, for the subjects have given up their right to make contracts (and therefore to break them) without the sovereigns permission within the terms. This, however, begs another question: why is the ability to make epistemological and moral judgments a necessary forfeiture to establishing the commonwealth? It doesnt seem logical that the right to break contracts must be a necessary forfeiture included within the person that one gives to the sovereign. After all, it falls under a set of negative-rights that requires a negative action (IE, a violation of the terms of contract) to occur before it can be used. Hobbes simply refuses to acknowledge the binary choice he creat es between civil war and good government is specious at best. The agreement to forfeit person is made equally amongst subjects to escape the state of nature, but even if the sovereign is not a part of the contract, the fact that a citizen doesnt receive the benefits termed within the contract ought to justify breaking the contract because other citizens may be receiving those benefits. If so, wouldnt it be just for a subject to break the contract, not with the sovereign, but with other subjects? Moving on from Hobbess derivation of sovereignty, one comes upon his formulation of sovereignty, the terms of his social contract. What is most shocking is that sovereignty is indivisible (Hobbes 115): the foundational elements of rule cannot be separated. All the powers of sovereignty must reside in the same body. A division of government, to Hobbes, would be redundant at best. From a theoretical point of view, when push comes to shove, a part of government, namely whichever has control of the army, will be revealed as the real holder of sovereign power precisely because it can seize control of the other powers. However, control of the army is nonexistent without the ability to fund it, so taxing and the coining of money is also essential. Imagine a scenario of rebellion or invasion in a divided government: an external force capable of protecting the taxing/treasury department would eventually rout the branch that controls the military. In order to ensure a stable government, then, it would be necessary to concentrate power at one locus using the example of the military any division would allow for opposing factions to gut one another, albeit indecisively. Combining the fact that sovereignty is indivisible with the fact that the social contract is made amongst subjects (that there is no bond between subjects and the sovereign), one arrives at Hobbess insistence that rebellion is never justifiable. Sovereignty is located in a person and not obedience to a person, so any repudiation of that obedience cannot dissolve the bond of sovereignty, for there is no bond to begin with. Nevertheless, this descriptive account of separating sovereign powers is not a normative claim that it ought not be done. This is perhaps Hobbess biggest mistake, for he believes that when, therefore, these two powers oppose one another, the commonwealth cannot but be in great danger of civil war and dissolution, for example, that the civil authorityà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã‚ ¦and the spiritual inevitably clash if divided (Hobbes 216). That is, we ought not separate the two, for sovereignty is conceived of as something that one simply has, meaning several branches of government would constantly be in contest for possession of sovereignty. However, this is an excellent example of the is-ought fallacy, for Hobbes bases the fact that historically, a division of government has always resulted in a collapse to monarchy, and attempts to re-justify the existing norms. The fact that civil and spiritual authority have historically clashed does not mean that they cannot avoid conflict in the future. If so, then Hobbess reason that they ought be combined falls apart. In essence, his claim is not normative, but only descriptive. Locke begins his attack on Hobbess concept of sovereignty by advancing a different conception of the state of nature. For Hobbes, in the state of nature à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã‚ ¦it is manifest that during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war (Hobbes 76), where à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã‚ ¦nothing can be unjust for where there is no common power, there is no law; where no law, no injustice (Hobbes 78). It is in Chapter XIII that he famously notes that the life of man is solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short, a product of the condition of warà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã‚ ¦(in which case everyone is governed by his own reasonà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã‚ ¦)à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã‚ ¦[where] man has a right to everything, even to one anothers body (Hobbes 80). It is from this anarchic view that Hobbes departs to create a theory of absolutist sovereignty. Individual rights, ironically, conflict to the point where there are no rights in the state of nature. To solve this proble m, Hobbess model forfeits person to an individual, because even two individuals two rulers with person will have conflicting rights claims. On the other hand, Locke paints a calmer picture of the state of nature, arguing that the state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, whichà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã‚ ¦teaches all mankindà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã‚ ¦that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions (Locke 9). Locke attack on Hobbess descriptive analysis of the state of nature is particularly damning because it has never occurred. Locke furthers that his notion of the state of nature is historical, that great societies began in the way that his theory described. He cites that the beginning of Rome and Venice were by the uniting of several free and independent of one another, amongst whom there was no natural superiority or subjection (Locke 54). This is because Locke believes that this moral nature has been instilled in humanity by an infinitely wise makerà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã‚ ¦sharing all in one community of nature, there cannot be supposed any such subordination (Locke 9). Unlike Hobb es, who believes there is no ethical frame for punishment during the state of nature, Locke argues that transgressing the law of nature means one declares himself to live by another rule than that of reason and common equity, which is that measure God has set to the actions of men (Locke 10). Locke believes that every man hath a right to punish the offender, and be executioner of the law of nature to criminals in the face of God. From a philosophically rigorous perspective, Lockes justifications are a copout to constructing a normative frame. But at a descriptive level, he may be correct: both Hobbes and Locke agree that it is through reason that mankind transcends the state of nature and enters a state of sovereignty. An elementary comparison of these two versions of the state of nature boils down to the fact that Hobbess interpretation is one that begins with a lack of reason and Lockes starts with reason programmed into mankind by a maker. Is it not possible that the Lockes state of nature simply follows Hobbess? Indeed, in Hobbess model, man must come upon reason prior to entering the social contract, meaning as a collective, they must eventually reach some form of Lockes state of nature. Whether God exists or not, a social consciousness must develop for both authors to successfully continue their theories. This returns us to the epistemological contradiction presented earlier in the fourth paragraph: why do men lose their ability to analyze the benefits of subjugation to a sovereign, if they needed to attain this level of rational deliberation to have accepted the social contract to begin with? It is because Hobbes ignores this concern, but Locke answers it (albeit with God, rather than a development of rationality, as I suggest), that Lockes interpretation of sovereignty is far more convincing. It is easiest to discuss Locke by making a series of modifications on Hobbess theory of sovereignty. Of course, the difference between the two theories is far more complicated, but in regards to the thesis, it is sufficient to identify three very closely-related, key differences. First, Locke dismisses Hobbess assertion (which I have showed to be contradictory multiple times) that subjects give up the right, in fact, the ability, to judge their sovereign when moving from the state of nature to sovereignty. Effectively, Locke makes the contract a two-way agreement instead of a one-way subjection, termed in his works as fiduciary power in Chapter XIII. Second, for Locke, ultimate sovereignty resides always in the people. One on hand, the supreme sovereign will always be God, but beneath his throne, men can delegate power to one another, but there will never be a permanent hierarchy of power. The supreme power of the legislature is amassed from a conditional grant by the people; every m an is bound by its laws, notwithstanding disagreement. By extension of this logic, Locke makes two foundational claims of his notion of sovereignty, which Hobbes does not adopt: one is that no part of the sovereign government will ever be above the law, the other is that power can be retracted from the government at any time, pending agreement of the people (these derivations are explored in detail in Chapters VIII and IX). The third and, perhaps most important, difference is that for Hobbes, sovereignty is a perpetual, indivisible power belonging to a particular individual. Indeed, this disagreement is the crux of this paper. For Locke, there are a variety of powers necessary for the protection of the public good, just as in Hobbes, but there is no need to unite them all in one body. Here Locke presents idea of the sovereignty of law itself: there is no need, that the legislative should be always in being, not having always business to do (Locke 76). The laws have a constant and lasting force, and need a perpetual execution that is provided by the executive power (Locke 76). While Hobbes agrees to the need of these aspects of sovereignty, he refuses to divide them. Locke, on the other hand, demonstrates that a division of labor can very feasibly exist, especially because he touches upon the idea of a natural power that pertains to other duties. Federative power, which relates to the power of war and pe ace, leagues and alliances, and all transactions (Locke 76), could easily be invested in entirely separate bodies from both the executive and legislative powers. The last question to answer, then, is whether the division of power is good. Luckily, Locke tackles this issue, arguing that the inconveniences of absolute power, which monarchy in succession was apt to lay claim to could never compete with balancing the power of government, by placing several parts of it in different hands for in doing so, citizens neither felt the oppression of tyrannical dominion, nor did the fashion of the age, nor their possessions, or way of livingà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã‚ ¦give them any reason to apprehend or provide against it (Locke 57). For Locke sovereignty is the supreme power on loan from the people to the legislative to set laws that look after the public good by dividing duties amongst the executive and other governmental agencies. Power is easily, helpfully, and safely split up into different bodies: easily due to Lockes dismissal of Hobbess contradictory objection to doing so, helpfully because the division of labor allows for increased efficiency and greater pr oductivity, and safely because the division of powers acts as a set of checks and balances to protect the people from arbitrary abuse. Just as it seems that the question Can sovereignty be divided? is answered, a concession of sorts to Hobbes appears with the concept of prerogative, a powerful modification of the way Lockes theory functions in practice. Locke concedes in Chapter XIV that the natural generality of law makes it inapplicable to certain cases and unable to cover every eventuality. The executive is therefore invested with prerogative, the power to act according to discretion, for the public good, without the prescription of the law, and sometimes even against it (Locke 84). It is possible that Hobbes would see this as an admission that Lockes legislative theory is flawed, that the executive does indeed hold supreme power, as both creator and enforcer of laws. This, however, would be a serious misinterpretation. In many ways, Locke disagrees with Hobbes most sharply on this point. Lockes emphasis on the need of governance to provide for the public good is so strong that he argues any violation of the social contract, by the sovereignty, would be grounds for the dissolution of government. He notes that citizens will be willing to cope with the application of prerogative as long as it aligns with the public good, even if they recognize that there is no legal precedence for the actions. While Lockes discussion of prerogative initially appears to be a return to Hobbesian absolutism, it is their most essential disagreement. In Hobbess theory, prerogative is sovereign authority, with no external check. When the sovereigns prerogative fails to lead towards the public good, subjects have no recourse but simply accept things. For Locke, prerogative is a minor modification of the authority delegated from the people to the legislative and thence to the executive. It is not crucial to the existence of g overnment because should subjects find that the executives application of prerogative does not lead to the public good, they can simply retract authority from the sovereignty. When compared with the work of Thomas Hobbes, John Lockes social contract theory comprehensively proves that government can be separated into several branches. By comparing the steps in their methodologies, along with analyzing their different starting points, one arrives at the conclusion that Locke is right. As this paper progressed, it was revealed that Hobbes made two main objections to a divided sovereignty: first, his notion of the forfeiture of person and second, his negative view of human behavior in the state of nature. Hobbess latter objection was easily answered back by comparing Lockes interpretation of the state of nature and demonstrating that the standard of reason created a double bind for Hobbes. Either his state of nature transitioned into a Lockean state of nature, which would then progress to sovereignty, or, a jump must occur from a Hobbesian state of nature straight into absolute sovereignty, which creates a number of contradictions. The former objection was ans wered on multiple levels, ranging from the is-ought fallacy to Lockes strong defense of a system of sovereign checks-and-balances. By juxtaposing Hobbes and Lockes social contract theories, one can decisively conclude that sovereignty can be divided, not only to two branches, but to as many as necessary for the public good. The version of Leviathan cited in this work is the Edwin Curley edited edition. The version of Second Treatise is the same as the one noted on the syllabus.